The United States and Saudi Arabia signed a civil nuclear cooperation agreement this Wednesday that opens the possibility for the kingdom to build its own uranium enrichment plant, in a decision that breaks with the non-proliferation standards that Washington had applied in the region and which comes amid the armed conflict that Donald Trump’s own administration is maintaining against Iran to dismantle Tehran’s nuclear program.
U.S. Secretary of Energy Chris Wright and Saudi Minister of Energy Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman signed the so-called “123 agreement”—in reference to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, which regulates the transfer of U.S. nuclear technology abroad—along with a “bilateral safeguards agreement.” The agreement has a 30-year term, involves U.S. companies in the development of the Saudi civil atomic program, and must be submitted to Congress for review.
Wright maintained that “the pact maintains the highest standards of nuclear safety and non-proliferation.” Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated from the Philippines that Washington will not reach any agreement that leads “to the risk of proliferation.” Neither offered details on the planned verification mechanisms, and that absence is what worries experts.
According to sources with direct knowledge of the decision consulted by AP, the agreement does not include the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the instrument that allows for broader inspections to verify that nuclear material is not diverted to military uses. Alexander Bollfrass, an expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, described the pact as “revolutionary” in a critical sense: the United States would be willing to transfer highly sensitive technology “without the same level of oversight that one would expect,” as he stated to AP.
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United States and Saudi Arabian flags wave along a highway in Riyadh, captured through a car window, ahead of the arrival of U.S. President Donald Trump in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on May 12, 2025.
The most immediate point of comparison is the United Arab Emirates, which in 2009 signed its own 123 agreement with Washington to build the Barakah nuclear plant, but expressly renounced uranium enrichment. That model has been considered by specialists as the “gold standard” for countries seeking atomic energy without generating suspicions of weapons ambitions. Saudi Arabia has historically resisted any clause that would force it to renounce the full nuclear fuel cycle.
That rejection has declared backing. The crown prince and de facto ruler of the kingdom, Mohammed bin Salman, publicly stated that Saudi Arabia would seek to develop its own nuclear weapons if Iran were to obtain an atomic bomb. In September 2025, Riyadh and Pakistan—a nuclear power—signed a mutual defense pact, and Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Mohammad Asif declared that Islamabad’s arsenal “will be available” to Saudi Arabia if necessary, a signal directed at Israel, considered the only state with nuclear weapons in the Middle East.
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Uranium enrichment does not automatically equate to weapons manufacturing, but it constitutes the technical threshold that separates a civilian program from a latent weaponization capability. Rosemary Kelanic, director for the Middle East at the think tank Defense Priorities, warned that such a capability “could give Riyadh a powerful source of leverage to extract future concessions from Washington.” The agreement would also benefit Westinghouse, the reactor manufacturer to which the Trump administration allocated $17.5 billion in loans to build ten new plants domestically.
The agreement enters into force unless a majority with veto power in Congress approves joint resolutions of disapproval. If it succeeds, it will consolidate a nuclear security architecture in the Middle East that is radically different from the one Washington has defended for decades.
