Daniel Ortega marks 19 years in power: how he consolidated the cruelest dictatorship in Nicaragua

In 2006, the sociologist and economist Óscar René Vargas was one of several Nicaraguan intellectuals who supported the electoral campaign for Daniel Ortega, the candidate of the Sandinista Front, to return to power.

That year, the old Sandinista leader was trying to regain the presidency of Nicaragua after three consecutive electoral defeats, in which he did everything to overcome the ceiling of more or less 38 percent of the Nicaraguans’ sympathies.

He dressed up as Chayanne and showed himself to be a troublemaker in 1990. Then he dressed in white and preached peace, reconverted into a kind of monk, in 1996. He asked for forgiveness from the Catholic Church that he persecuted in the 80s and even abandoned the civil union he had with Rosario Murillo and got married in a solemn religious ceremony to appear familiar and in tune with Catholic precepts, in the campaigns of 2001 and 2006. That didn’t do him any good. His voters didn’t exceed 38 percent and to win in the first round, according to Nicaraguan electoral rules, he needed to surpass 45 percent of the votes, a bar that was too high for him. And in the second round he had no chance against a majority united anti-Sandinism.

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The lifeline came to him through a pact with the then liberal caudillo, Arnoldo Alemán, who allowed him, despite being in the minority in parliament, to reform the constitution and lower the electoral requirement to win in the first round to 35 percent of the votes. Practically a rule tailored to his needs. Thus, with anti-Sandinism divided, he wins the 2006 elections in the first round, with only 38 percent of the votes. With Ortega’s triumph, Oscar Rene Vargas, a veteran Sandinista, was appointed ambassador of the new government in France. But after a few months he was removed from his post following an interview “without permission” he gave to the newspaper La Prensa. “I broke with Ortega in July 2007, because of the way they did it (the dismissal),” he says. From another sidewalk, Juan Diego Barberena watched with fear Ortega’s return to power in that January of 2007. He was only 11 years old then and came from a family with anti-Sandinista credentials. Even his father fought against the Sandinista revolution in the 80s. “The first thing I thought is that the country was going to return to what it had experienced in the 80s, which is what my family told me. There was much talk of war and mandatory military service. There was talk that rationing was going to return and that many people were going to go into exile,” relates Barberena. The Nicaragua that Barberena knew was beginning to cease to exist. “There was freedom of expression, citizens could express themselves freely and the media reported without any kind of problems. There could be some obstacles, as in any imperfect democracy, but there was freedom of movement, in such a way that the Sandinista Front mobilized and constantly promoted strikes,” he recalls from his childhood. It is now known that the most notorious loss of that stage that was dying with Ortega was the alternation in power. “For the first time in our recent political history there was alternation in power. Public freedoms were in force,” he adds.

Sociologist Vargas participated early in the design of the new country, through a small “strategic” committee of just five people that met frequently and where, in principle, “Rosario Murillo was not allowed to enter”. Divide the Ortega regime into two stages. One from when he took power until 2017 and another from then until today. “The stage from 2007 to 2017 is when he achieves an alliance with the Church through Cardinal Obando, an alliance with big capital and with the traditional political parties in the figures of (Arnoldo) Alemán and (Eduardo) Montealegre,” says Vargas. The United States and the European Union accepted Ortega  “as the lesser evil,” and the flow of resources from Venezuela allowed for the consolidation of a network of political patronage and the emergence of what Vargas calls “the chayo bourgeoisie.” During those years, the country experienced a deceptive calm. “There was selective repression, but without major complications,” says the sociologist. There were peasant marches, some freedom of the press, and sustained economic growth, averaging over 3 percent annually.

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But, beneath the surface, a slow decomposition of the social and political fabric was occurring. In 2016, the regime began to eliminate opposition parties and empty the elections of content. Massive abstention in the general and municipal elections was an early sign of the crisis to come. For the first ten years, Ortega governed in a strange alliance with big capital, which allowed him to consolidate the dictatorship through the control and submission of all the powers of the State, the Army and the Police. Ortega gave apparent power to the businessmen in the economic management of the country, on the condition that he be allowed to do what he wanted in the political field. The oil money that arrived from Venezuela for his free use allowed him to create a client base that did not resist when their freedoms were taken away. Against the current of the current Political Constitution, Ortega established presidential re-election, and annulled the elections, which since 2008 began to be a useless exercise where Ortega’s group of power decided who participated, who won and who lost. Of course, Ortega always won. Thus, he has been re-elected three times, each time with a higher number of votes that he himself has decided. Barberena identifies three decisive moments. “The first is the electoral fraud of 2008,” which allowed the Sandinista Front to control the territory and deploy its surveillance machinery. The second was the Supreme Court ruling that enabled presidential re-election in 2011. “There are clear culprits in the Supreme Court of Justice,” he underlines. The third, the constitutional reform of 2014 that allowed indefinite re-election and laid the foundations for perpetuation in power. The definitive break came in April 2018. The civic rebellion, triggered by reforms to the social security system, turned into a national demand for regime change.

The response was a brutal repression that left hundreds dead, thousands injured, and an unprecedented wave of exile in peacetime. “It was brutally suppressed and inaugurated the most serious phase of human rights violations and the consolidation of a totalitarian regime,” says Barberena.

Since then, the repression became permanent. Journalists, human rights defenders, student, religious and political leaders were imprisoned, stripped of their nationality or forced into exile under accusations of “treason to the homeland”. In 2021, the regime did the most absurd thing imaginable in an electoral campaign. It arrested all the opponents who wanted to compete against it. Seven candidates ended up in prison. “The re-election without political competition in 2021, with all presidential candidates in prison,” summarizes Barberena, marked a point of no return. That same year, Ortega and Murillo proclaimed themselves in power without disguise. In 2022 and then in 2025, constitutional reforms finished dismantling the legal order. Barberena recalls that “in the history of Nicaragua, only William Walker in 1856 and now Ortega and Murillo have proclaimed themselves in power.”

Why did Ortega choose dictatorship to govern? The first answer is because he could, and the second is because he needed it to install his dynasty. “Ortega and his closest circle never conceived of life outside of power”, says Barberena. The electoral defeat of 1990 was an experience they were not willing to repeat. “When they retook power on January 10, 2007, they did so with the absolute conviction of never giving it up, as recognized by commander (Sandinista) Tomas Borge”.

Today, with Daniel Ortega nearing 80 years old and practically absent from public life, Rosario Murillo’s rise is complete. The figure of the “co-president”, introduced in the 2025 Constitution, formalized a power she already exercised de facto. Ortega appears less and less, while Murillo controls the discourse, the administration, and the repression. In the international arena, events in Venezuela have introduced a new element of uncertainty. Barberena considers that “the transition that seems to be starting in Venezuela will inevitably have an effect on Nicaragua.” Venezuela was the main political and economic ally of the regime, along with Cuba. Its weakening forces Ortega and Murillo to recalculate their opportunities. Vargas agrees that the impact is accelerating. “The pillars supporting the regime have been fractured by the repression itself,” he says. The economy is growing at an average of just 2 percent annually since 2018, well below the previous period. In this context, Vargas outlines several scenarios for 2026. The first, authoritarian continuity with dynastic succession. The second, a controlled electoral opening to buy time. The third, a civic-military coup. “Those scenarios are still valid,” he affirms.

For Barberena, the regime faces a similar dilemma. “I see two scenarios: negotiation or total radicalization led by Rosario Murillo.” In both cases, 2026 will be a key year. “My impression is that 2026 will be a year of very high political intensity in Nicaragua,” he maintains. Vargas is more categorical about the outcome. “I think his political time is over,” he says about Ortega. He claims that he supported Ortega’s return to power because he believed, like others, that there was a possibility of improving the social conditions of the country after sixteen years of liberal governments. Everything went for the worse.

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Juan Diego Barberena, like hundreds of thousands of other Nicaraguans, is in exile. Nineteen years is two-thirds of his life. In that time he graduated as a lawyer in Managua, did a postgraduate degree in Costa Rica and a master’s degree in Spain. And, of course, he is an opponent.

Due to his critical positions, Ortega imprisoned Oscar René Vargas, his former comrade-in-arms and ally. He banished him and now he also lives in exile, in Costa Rica. “It’s a cruel dictatorship. I consider it to be even worse than Somoza’s, because Somoza had repressive peaks, but not a constant repression like the current one,” he says.